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ABSTRACT 
This survey examines the empirical literature on the relationship between public R&D subsidies and 
private R&D investment over the past five decades. The survey reveals a considerable heterogeneity 
of empirical results that cannot be explained fully by methodological issues. We aim to provide 
further explanations of the possible causes of that heterogeneity. In particular, we emphasise a set of 
issues that, in our view, are critical to understanding the potential effect of public R&D subsidies on 
private R&D spending. Special attention is paid to the dynamic aspects and composition of firm R&D, 
the constraints faced by the firm (such as financial constraints), and the amount and source of public 
subsidies. None of these issues have been investigated in depth. We formulate a set of research 
assumptions to guide future empirical research in this field. 
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1INTRODUCTION
The use of public funding to foster private research and development (R&D) activities is
a common practice in many countries. According to Eurostat (2009), the public share in R&D
activities from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s was about 35% in the EU27, 30% in the
United States, and 18.5% in Japan. Furthermore, a sizeable amount of these public funds is
actually used to subsidise R&D activities undertaken by private firms.
The major argument raised by economists to justify the public support of R&D (through
public subsidies, among other means) is that market failures would otherwise hamper firms
from reaching the socially optimal level of R&D (Arrow, 1962; Stiglitz, 1988). Such market
failures have to do with the incomplete appropriability of R&D returns and the problems of
information and incomplete markets. The ‘public good’ characteristics of R&D would prevent
firms from completely appropriating the potential benefits from the innovations generated
from their R&D activities as other firms would have the opportunity to free ride. Even if
innovations could be fully appropriated, the existence of capital market imperfections may
also lead private firms to disregard socially valuable R&D projects (Griliches, 1986; Hall,
2002). Due to the risk associated with R&D activities and information asymmetries between
borrowers and lenders, the financial opportunities to engage in R&D activities are limited.
Policymakers could then contribute to reducing the cost of riskier but socially valuable R&D
projects, increasing the firms’ expected return to such R&D projects.
Certainly, public policies should be aimed at supporting only those private R&D projects
that are socially desirable and would not otherwise be undertaken. Nevertheless, given the
aforementioned information problems associated with R&D projects, identifying the target
projects to which public effort should be devoted is not a simple task. Typically, public
policies to support private R&D have consisted of tax allowances and, above all, public
subsidies to partially fund private R&D projects.1 The conditions for both eligibility and
2granting decisions are very broad and differ over time and among countries or regions and
sectors of activity. To ascertain the effectiveness of public expenditures in this context, a large
body of empirical research has assessed the relationship between public R&D subsidies and
company-financed R&D. The major research question has been whether public R&D
subsidies are either complementary and, thus, ‘additional’ to company-financed R&D or
whether they substitute for and, thus, ‘crowd out’ private R&D (David et al. 2000). After
almost five decades of research, the empirical evidence is mixed, and the question is far from
having a conclusive answer. The disparity in results can be attributed to differences in the
populations under study (time periods, countries of interest, business sectors), the variables
used, and the empirical approach (see, among others, Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Capron and
Van Pottelsberghe, 1997; David et al., 2000; García-Quevedo, 2004; González and Pazó,
2008).
The main goals of this survey are to provide a critical and systematic review of the
empirical literature on the relation between public R&D subsidies and private R&D
investment and to identify issues that may require further exploration.2 Namely, we are
concerned with firm R&D dynamics and composition, firm financial structure, and the history
and funding sources of subsidies (i.e., federal/national, regional or local). We seek to connect
these issues with situations under which the alternative hypotheses of additionality (i.e., the
crowding-in effect) and substitution (i.e., the crowding-out effect) are more likely to occur.
This knowledge could help researchers to obtain new insights and, hence, gain a better
understanding of the real nature of the link between public R&D subsidies and private R&D
spending.
To the best of our knowledge, and as will be observed in the literature review, the
evidence about the roles of the aforementioned issues in the impact of public subsidies on
company-financed R&D is limited. Despite its importance, research has mostly focused on
3solving several methodological problems, like the choice of the most valid evaluation method,
and on extending previous studies to other contexts (e.g., a different time period, country, or
sector of activity).
The study is organised as follows. The second section provides a systematic review of the
empirical literature about the link between public R&D subsidies and company-financed
R&D. We use this baseline to deepen our examination of each of the critical issues at stake
and posit our research assumptions in the next section. The paper ends with our concluding
remarks and suggestions for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Blank and Stigler (1957) were among the first researchers to perform an empirical
analysis of the relationship between publicly funded and private R&D investment. Their
results were mixed, with evidence supporting both additionality and substitution effects. Such
findings are highly representative of the evidence reported since then in this field of study. In
Table 1 we provide a representative list of the most relevant empirical studies carried out
since the middle of the 1960s, which amount to 77 quantitative empirical studies. The table
indicates the authorship, the country in which the study was performed, the sample period, the
unit of analysis, the definition and measurement of the relevant variables, the empirical
approach, and the main findings. We also report for each paper whether the following
essential standardised issues were accounted for: a) the sources of public subsidies; b) the
composition of firm R&D; c) the firm’s past and current subsidies; d) the specific time lag
structure, namely short- and/or long-term effects; e) the functional form of the effect (linear or
nonlinear); and f) the potential financial constraints. Additionally, in the last column of the
table, we report for each study an indicator of its age-weighted citations to provide a measure
of its relative impact in the subsequent development of this research topic.
4Insert Table 1 about here
We can summarise the results from Table 1 as follows. First, most of the relevant
empirical studies listed in Table 1 were performed during the 2000s (43 out of 77). Together
with the increasing availability of appropriate datasets, this is a clear sign of the growing
concern about the role that public subsidies play in private R&D decisions. Second,
examination of the main findings corroborates the existence of a great diversity of results. The
results from many studies support the so-called ‘additionality’ or ‘crowding-in’ hypothesis,
according to which public R&D subsidies tend to stimulate additional company-financed
R&D. Other studies, on the contrary, find evidence for the so-called ‘crowding-out’
hypothesis, according to which public R&D subsidies offset private R&D. Last, some studies
find insignificant or mixed effects.
From a theoretical point of view, the net effect of public subsidies on the level of
company-financed R&D is ambiguous. There exist counteracting effects, and the net effect
depends on different factors. Needless to say, testing the additionality hypothesis is a policy-
relevant issue for evaluating the use of public funds to subsidise private R&D activities. The
existence of conflicting results among different empirical studies is usually ascribed to
methodological differences related to the unit of analysis (country, industry, firm,
establishment or plant), the geographical scope, the measurement and definition of the
variables or the quantitative methods used. As mentioned earlier, such methodological
differences hamper comparisons of results between different empirical studies.
Table 1 shows that about three fourths (56 out of 77) of the reviewed studies were
conducted at the microeconomic level, for which the unit of analysis is the firm or even the
plant and/or line of business, whereas the remaining studies used aggregate data by industry
or by country. In line with Mansfield and Switzer (1984), and others (e.g., Ali-Yrkkö, 2005;
5David et al., 2000; Levy and Terleckyj, 1983), we advocate for the obvious advantages of
firm-level studies. Studies at a high level of aggregation cannot account for heterogeneities
between firms. Precisely, this literature is aimed at evaluating the effect of public subsidies,
which are granted at the firm level, so the relevant unit of analysis is the firm itself.
Table 2 summarises, for the whole list of studies, the distribution of the overall findings
by a simple vote-counting approach. The sample of studies in Table 1 has been grouped
according to the disaggregation level and the geographical scope of the analysis.
Approximately 60 percent of the studies find that public subsidies are complementary and
thus ’add’ to private R&D investment. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this result is
prevalent regardless of the level of aggregation considered.3
Insert Table 2 about here
In light of Table 1, the following issues with respect to data structure are worth
mentioning. First, studies differ widely in the time period under analysis. Second, studies
using cross-sectional data prevail over those using longitudinal data. Third, the dominant
geographical scope for testing the effectiveness of R&D subsidies has changed substantially
over time. Until the 1990s, most of the empirical studies were performed with US data, and
occasionally data from Canada or the UK. Since the 1990s, most studies have used data from
the EU and other developed countries (Austria, Belgium, China, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Ireland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden). However, the
conflicting results obtained in different studies are independent of the group of countries
considered (see Table 2). Studies of developing countries, in addition to Özçelik and Taymaz
(2008) for Turkey, are very scant. Fourth, studies also differ in the industries considered.
Most studies are focused on manufacturing industries. However, there are many differences in
the degree of innovation across different manufacturing industries. Whereas many studies
6consider firms belonging to industries with different innovation levels, others are concentrated
on firms operating in high-technology industries (Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; Ali-Yrkkö,
2005; Duguet, 2004; Howe and McFetridge, 1976; Klette and Møen, 1998; Koga, 2005;
Leyden and Link, 1991; Leyden et al., 1989; Mansfield and Switzer, 1984; Shrieves, 1978;
and Wallsten, 2000).
Other potential sources of ambiguity in the results include the alternative definitions and
measures of the main variables of interest. With regard to the dependent variable, private
R&D, there are several alternative measures, as shown by Table 1. The most common
measure is R&D intensity, i.e., firm R&D expenditure relative to sales. Two alternative
measures of R&D expenditure are used: total R&D expenditures and private R&D
expenditures (i.e., total R&D expenditures minus the amount of total public R&D subsidies).
With regard to the subsidy variable, studies differ in considering public grants, contracts, or
total government funding of firm R&D activity. Quite often, measurement and definition
differences are due to limitations related to the availability of data. Therefore, researchers
should be conscious of this important fact when interpreting their empirical results.
David et al. (2000) criticised the econometric methods of nearly all research performed
until the end of the 1990s for largely ignoring endogeneity problems.4 Table 1 shows how the
traditional approach relied on least squares (OLS) estimation of linear regression models.
However, the potential sources of endogeneity might lead to inconsistent estimates of the
causal effect of subsidies on private R&D decisions. To address endogeneity problems in such
a way as to obtain appropriate estimates of this causal effect, several approaches have been
used, which can be summarised as follows: 1) difference-in-differences estimators; 2) sample
selection models; 3) instrumental variables; and 4) non-parametric matching methods.5 The
approaches depend on different sets of assumptions, so they differ in their advantages and
disadvantages. This fact has led several researchers (e.g., Aerts and Thowarth, 2008; Görg
7and Strobl, 2007; Özçelik and Taymaz, 2008) to suggest combining some of them (see Table
1) to improve the accuracy of the evaluation study. Recently, some researchers have taken a
step forward by proposing new econometric approaches, such as the conditional difference-in-
differences estimator (e.g., Aerts and Schmidt, 2008).6
SOME KEY ISSUES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC R&D
SUBSIDIES AND PRIVATE R&D SPENDING
As discussed earlier, the empirical literature reports mixed results about the causal effect
of public subsidies on private R&D investment. To disentangle the reasons behind this
conflicting evidence, it is worthwhile to put forward some ways to improve the empirical
analysis about this causal relationship that have been scarcely explored until now. Among the
most representative issues, we focus on firms’ subsidy history, the time lag, the existence of
financial constraints, the components of R&D, and the amount and sources of public subsidies
of private firms’ R&D.
Subsidy History
Among the main contributions that describe the history of subsidies to firms, it is worth
mentioning Aschhoff (2009), Duguet (2004), Bloch and Graversen (2008), Hussinger (2008),
and González and Pazó (2008). There is pervasive evidence in the existing literature to
indicate that the subsidies granted to a firm are relatively persistent over time, so that a firm
whose R&D activity was subsidised in the past is more likely to be subsidised again.
However, from the theoretical point of view, it is uncertain how a firm’s subsidy history
affects its level of R&D investment as there can be opposing crowding-in and crowding-out
effects. Aschhoff (2009, pp.6-7) describes the existence of several forces at play in this
relationship.
8Firms that were successful in the past in achieving public subsidies for their R&D
projects might benefit from their experience, learning and information advantages in
subsequent calls for subsidy applications. Such advantages entail lower application costs and
better application opportunities for previously funded firms. Hence, their relative probabilities
of applying more often increase. Additionally, their applications are expected to be better
tailored to the subsidy criterion, which increases their probabilities of receiving a grant. We
would thus expect the projects of previously funded firms to be selected more often,
irrespective of the firms’ actual need for financial support.
The government’s behaviour can also favour projects of firms that apply for subsidies
more often for two reasons. On the one hand, governments tend to maximise the success rate
of subsidised R&D projects, thus following a picking-the-winners strategy. On the other hand,
government might comply with attempts of specific interest groups to prioritise certain firms.
In both cases, authorities give preference to the projects of those firms that show strong R&D
capabilities in the light of the requirements of the call for applications.7 However, projects
with high expected returns would otherwise be fully financed by the firms or by private
external investors.
Thus, firms that are granted public subsidies for their R&D are more likely to benefit
from grants that reduce their own risk and cost of financing R&D projects. Consequently, the
odds of a crowding-out effect for frequent recipients of R&D subsidies are increased
(Aschhoff, 2009; Löof and Hesmati, 2005; Wallsten, 2000).
All prior supplementary arguments lead us to put forward the following assumption:
Research assumption 1a: The crowding-out effect of public subsidies on private R&D
investment might be stronger in firms that are frequent recipients of public subsidies than
in first-time recipients.
9Aschhoff (2009) argues that a firm may become a frequent applicant for public R&D
subsidies because of a governmental policy that prioritises riskier but promising projects that
firms would not have conducted without public funding. Furthermore, the time schedule of
the subsidies can be shorter than the duration of the R&D project, so firms that have already
received a subsidy for a particular R&D project might subsequently apply for new subsidies
to keep financing the same project.8 Such a subsidy scheme would be rather stable in terms of
recipient firms, and we would not expect a substitution effect. Aschhoff (2009), Duguet
(2004), and Hussinger (2008) provide support for these arguments, by which public R&D
subsidies might have a stimulating (crowding-in) effect on the R&D investments of these
firms. We then state the following assumption:
Research assumption 1b: The crowding-in effect of public subsidies on private R&D
investment might be stronger in firms that are frequent recipients of public subsidies than
in first-time recipients.
Time Lag
Most empirical studies have been concerned mainly with evaluating a contemporaneous
or short-term effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D investment. However, as R&D
investment takes time to implement, the full effect of a subsidy may be distributed over a
longer period of time. To our knowledge, few empirical studies feature the specific time lag
structure of subsidies on private R&D investment. Levy and Terleckyj (1983) find an average
three-year lag in the complementary relationship between public R&D subsidies and private
R&D.9 Mansfield and Switzer (1984) and Lichtenberg (1984) also find a complementary
relation that takes effect after two years.10 Klette and Møen (1998) find that temporary R&D
subsidies seem to stimulate firms to increase their R&D expenditures after the subsidies have
expired —in most cases, during the first two years. Bentzen and Smith (1999) also reveal a
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positive and significant influence of public R&D on private R&D in the long term.
Nevertheless, they do not identify the specific time lag. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2000)
find a one- or two-year lag. Callejón and García-Quevedo (2002) and Lach (2002) find that
the effect of public subsidies primarily takes place with a time lag of one year and becomes
non-significant after the second year.
In line with Levy and Terleckyj (1983, p.554) and other researchers (e.g., Klette and
Møen, 1998; Lach, 2002; or Cerulli, 2010), we argue that the effect of subsidies on private
R&D activities might last longer than the subsidy itself. Receiving public funding via
subsidies in one year can boost additional private R&D activities in subsequent years. David
et al. (2000, pp.508-509) and others (e.g., Koga, 2005, pp.60-61) suggest that public funding
of R&D can have two positive dynamic or ‘long-term’ effects on private R&D investment.
First, firms can benefit from the spillovers of the new science and engineering knowledge
resulting from public R&D funding, thus enhancing firms’ technological opportunities and,
ultimately, innovative ability. Second, the availability of qualified research personnel that
firms can hire is increased thanks to public funding of R&D activities.
Another important reason why the effect of subsidies need not be instantaneous and can
be distributed over several years is the existence of firm adjustment costs (Lucas, 1967)
associated with R&D activities. These activities are complex to implement and involve
handling new resources or reallocating existing firm resources, such as qualified personnel,
which would otherwise be devoted to production. If the firm optimal level of R&D
investment is so high that it requires a substantial reorganisation within the firm, the costs to
the firm can be much higher that if the firm distributes the necessary changes over a longer
length of time. In addition to technological reasons, adjustment costs can be increased by the
existence of market imperfections. The major consequence of adjustment costs is that, in
general, it will take several years for the firm to achieve its target R&D investment. In
11
particular, the response of firm R&D investment to public subsidies will not be instantaneous,
but rather distributed over several years.
All of these arguments lead us to posit the following assumption:
Research assumption 2: The effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment might
not be instantaneous, but rather distributed over several years.
Financial Constraints
Financial constraints due to capital market imperfections have been raised as a major
reason for government intervention in private R&D investment (Arrow, 1962; Hall, 1992,
2002; Ughetto, 2008; Takalo and Tanayama, 2010). Among the authors who have explored
this specific issue empirically, Ali-Yrkkö (2005), Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005), and
Czarnitzki et al. (2011) are notable.
Many empirical studies show that private R&D projects are mostly financed by internal
funds (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Hall, 1992; Hao and Jaffe, 1993; Himmelberg and Petersen,
1994; Ughetto, 2008). There are several reasons for the relative scarcity of external funding of
R&D projects, all of which have to do with the extreme uncertainty about their success and
their potential benefits (e.g., Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Ughetto,
2008) and the strategic nature of R&D, which might restrain managers from revealing the
features of their R&D projects to prevent their disclosure to competitors (Bhattacharya and
Ritter, 1983; Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Scellato, 2007; Ughetto, 2008). Such reasons lead to
asymmetry of information problems, like adverse selection and moral hazard (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), that might discourage external investors, whose
assessment of the expected returns is less reliable than the internal assessment (Czarnitzki and
Hottenrott, 2010; Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Takalo and Tanayama, 2010; Ughetto, 2008).
Moreover, the intangible nature of R&D hinders the use of collateral by innovative firms to
12
secure their borrowing (Berger and Udell, 1990; Bester, 1985; Hubbard, 1998; Močnik, 2001; 
Ughetto, 2008).
The aforementioned circumstances can lead to a higher cost of external finance due to
requirements of a risk premium on external finance, or even to the possibility of finance
rationing. Thus, firms will be prompted to put more weight on internal funds to conduct their
R&D projects, making their R&D decisions sensitive to their availability of internal liquidity.
In this respect, a shortage of internal liquidity might circumscribe firms’ ability to conduct
R&D projects that would otherwise be undertaken (Czarnitzki et al., 2011, p.528).11
The empirical evidence is, in general, consistent with the view that financial constraints
may deter successful R&D projects (Czarnitzki et al., 2011) and that public R&D subsidies
appear as a public policy instrument aimed at offsetting the negative effect of financial
constraints on private R&D activities (Wren, 1994; Blanes and Busom, 2004; Hyytinen and
Toivanen, 2005).12 Ali-Yrkkö (2005) shows that financially constrained companies are more
likely to use public subsidies to finance riskier but promising R&D projects that would
otherwise be dismissed or postponed. In particular, he finds a positive effect of public funding
on R&D of small firms, which are more likely to face financial constraints.13 Furthermore, we
think the role of public subsidies can be especially relevant for small and young firms, for
which liquidity constraints can be more severe.14 All of these arguments lead us to propose
the following:
Research assumption 3: The crowding-in effect of public subsidies on private R&D
investment will be stronger in financially constrained firms. In this context, we also
expect the crowding-in effect to be stronger in small and young firms.
Components of R&D
Most empirical studies, as shown by Table 1, have treated private R&D expenditure as a
single or homogeneous activity. However, Mansfield (1980) and others (Aerts and Thorwarth,
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2008; Clausen, 2007; Diamond, 1999; Link, 1982; Nelson, 1959; Robson, 1993) have
highlighted that R&D activity spans a wide range of different complex tasks. At a minimum,
the traditional breakdown of R&D expenditure into its two major components, Research and
Development, deserves to be considered.15
Several studies have explored the effect of public subsidies and public R&D activities on
the two major components of R&D. For instance, the empirical studies by Higgins and Link
(1981) and Aerts and Thorwarth (2008) note that public R&D activities tend to reduce the
research expenditure by private firms. The latter authors find a positive effect of public R&D
subsidies on private expenditures on development. In the same line, Link (1982) finds a
positive effect of increased public R&D subsidies on private R&D expenditure, which is
mostly aimed at development.16 On the contrary, Robson (1993) and Diamond (1999) find
positive effects of public subsidies on private R&D, which mostly affect (basic) research
expenditures. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) find that public subsidies have a significant and positive
effect on private research expenditures, whereas the effect on private development
expenditures is also positive but non-significant. Interestingly, Clausen (2007) distinguishes
between public subsidies for research and for development. He finds that whereas subsidies to
research have a positive effect on private R&D (particularly, research) expenditures, subsidies
to development tend to substitute for private R&D expenditures, mostly reducing private
development spending.
It is widely agreed that research activities and development activities are very different in
their features and their prospects. In particular, uncertainty and intangibility characterise
research to a greater extent than development. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) and Cockburn and
Henderson (1998), among others, emphasise that a firm’s research activity stimulates its
‘absorptive capacity’, a major intangible that improves the firm’s competitive advantage.
Nelson (1959) suggests that firms devoted to exploratory research, which are more focused on
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research than on development, enjoy better long-term prospects. Czarnitzki et al. (2009), in
line with Griliches (1986), also show that research expenditures yield higher probabilities of
patenting than development expenditures.
By the same token, the uncertain and intangible outcomes of research projects prevent
their full appropriation by firms. Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962) suggest that firm
underinvestment is likely to be more stringent in research than in development activities as
the returns associated with the former are harder to appropriate. In this respect, public
subsidies can reduce the gap between social and private benefits, fostering research projects
of private firms (Clausen, 2007; Czarnitzki et al., 2011). On the contrary, development
projects usually face less uncertainty and have much higher tangibility than research projects.
These projects are ‘close to the market’ and, therefore, “similar to practical and firm specific
problem-solving activities” (Clausen, 2007, p.5). Moreover, such projects usually have
specific commercial (and therefore tangible) objectives, so firm have the proper incentives to
perform their development projects to the extent that their returns can usually be appropriated
(Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008). Consequently, the traditional market failure argument (Arrow,
1962; Stiglitz, 1988) to justify public subsidies is much weaker in the case of development
projects as opposed to research projects.
All of these arguments lead us to put forward the following assumption:
Research assumption 4: The response of firms to public subsidies might be dependent
on the composition of R&D investment. We would expect public subsidies to have a
stronger crowding-in effect, the larger the weight of research activities and the smaller
the weight of development activities in firm R&D investment.
Subsidy Amount
In the empirical assessment of the effect of public subsidies on firms’ R&D investment,
most studies have disregarded the amount of the subsidy granted to the firm. However, the
15
amount of subsidies received differs very much between firms. Four notable studies focus on
the quantitative effect of the subsidy amount granted to the firms. Guellec and Pottelsberghe
(2000) find a nonlinear relationship between public subsidies and privately financed R&D,
namely, an inverted U-shaped curve. Thus, the subsidy effect is positive but marginally
decreasing up to a certain threshold, beyond which the effect becomes negative. This result
suggests a crowding-in effect of moderate subsidy amounts and a crowding-out effect for
subsidies beyond a certain level. Zhu et al. (2006) and Görg and Strobl (2007) find similar
results. Aschhoff (2009) demonstrates that a minimum grant size is necessary to increase the
scope of firm-financed R&D activities and remarks that, for a certain subsidy amount, the
sign of its effect might depend on the size of the project. Larger projects might be more
dependent on the provision of public money, whereas firms might be more willing to bear the
risk of a smaller project alone. Hence, for a given subsidy amount, the larger the project, the
higher the probability of a crowding-in effect becomes. Nevertheless, we should expect R&D
activities to be inelastic beyond a certain degree. The firm’s resources circumscribe the scale
of its business, which also includes R&D activities, because their capabilities are limited. If
the firm receives more subsidies to conduct a larger project, so that it must use its resources to
its maximum capacity, the firm might reallocate R&D funds from other projects to the largest
one, thus postponing or discontinuing other projects. Therefore, other things being equal, the
probability of a crowding-out effect can be expected to increase with the subsidy size. Thus,
we assume that:
Research assumption 5: The effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment might be
characterised by an inverted U-shaped curve. Such an effect is positive up to a certain
threshold (i.e., the crowding-in effect would prevail) and negative beyond (with the crowding-
out effect dominating).
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Sources of Funding
In most countries, a variety of public agencies provide public subsidies for private R&D.
In particular, supranational, national and regional subsidy programmes exist in EU
countries,17 and federal and state subsidy programmes operate in the US. Most empirical
studies have addressed the effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment irrespective
of the public agency granting the subsidies, so the ‘average’ effect of subsidies is considered.
This statement is acknowledged in Table 1, which shows that most existing research has
evaluated the effect of single subsidy programmes allocated by agencies at the level of federal
or national governments. Nonetheless, several researchers have explored the average effect of
R&D programmes allocated by different public agencies at the international, national or
regional levels.18 Although the evidence is mixed, most studies provide support for
additionality when the ‘average’ effect of subsidies awarded by different agencies is
considered. Blanes and Busom (2004)19 find that differences between firms, industries and
public agencies affect firms’ participation in different public subsidy programmes (mainly at
the national and regional levels). To our knowledge, Clausen (2007) is the only study that
addresses whether public programmes conducted by different public agencies entail different
effects on private R&D investment.
We argue that the way in which private R&D investment is affected by the features of the
source of public funding, namely, the public agency involved, deserves further study. In
particular, it would be worthwhile to study the grant criteria established by the different
public agencies and construct taxonomies to assess how different requirements and awarding
criteria can stimulate or substitute private R&D spending (see David et al., 2000; Klette et al.,
2000, among others). Clausen (2007) finds that the source of a subsidy influences whether it
is used to stimulate firm R&D activities (mainly research activities) or to substitute some of
them (mainly development activities).20
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Even in the unlikely case that requirements and awarding criteria do not differ among
public agencies, assuming also small application costs, we would expect that a firm applying
to one agency for a subsidy might also apply to other agencies for subsidies to fund the same
R&D project (Blanes and Busom, 2004). Eventually, a firm might obtain subsidies from
multiple agencies to fund the same R&D project. In this case, public subsidies are more likely
to substitute private R&D spending. A firm in this situation might enjoy excess resources to
finance a certain project, especially if the project is small, which can be diverted towards non-
subsidised projects. More realistically, a firm with several projects, each subsidised by
different public agencies, may end up reallocating funds between the projects, thus creating a
substitution effect. On the contrary, a firm might have a large and riskier project that would
require funding from multiple public agencies. In this case, we might find that a
complementary effect exists between the sum of the subsidies received from different
agencies and firm R&D investment. All of these arguments lead us to put forward the
following two assumptions:
Research assumption 6a: The crowding-out effect of public subsidies on private R&D
investments might be more likely in firms conducting small R&D projects when these
projects are financed by different agencies.
Research assumption 6b: The crowding-in effect of public subsidies on private R&D
investments might be more likely in firms conducting large R&D projects when these
projects are financed by different agencies.
CONCLUSIONS
A large number of empirical studies in the last five decades have investigated the
effectiveness of public subsidies of private R&D spending. In general, scholars and
policymakers agree about the desirability of subsidising private R&D activities. The market
failure argument resting on the ‘public good’ nature of innovations, which deters full
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appropriation and leads the level of private innovation below the socially optimal level, drives
this agreement. Furthermore, capital market imperfections leading to financial constraints on
risky projects, such as R&D activities, also contribute to reducing the private R&D
investment below the socially optimal level (Arrow, 1962; Hall, 1992, 2002). Public R&D
activities and public subsidies of private R&D are used as policy instruments to fill the gap
between the private and the socially optimal levels of R&D investment. Accordingly, many
empirical studies have aimed at assessing the causal effect of public subsidies on private R&D
investment.
Our review of the empirical literature on the impact of public subsidies on private R&D
investments yields the following conclusions. First, together with the increasing availability
of appropriate data, there is rising concern about the effectiveness of public subsidies, which
reflects societal demands for efficient use of public funds. Second, most studies have
concentrated on developed countries, mainly the US and the EU countries, and there is little
evidence for other countries, particularly developing and emerging countries. Third, most
available data come from studies performed at the firm level, as the firm is the real recipient
of public subsidies. We agree there are outstanding empirical contributions based on
aggregate data on the effect of subsidies on private R&D decisions, and that studies with
aggregate and micro data complement each other. However, we believe that longitudinal
micro data at firm, establishment or plant level allow addressing questions at the very same
level at which decisions are taken. Such data allow accounting not only for dynamic
considerations ―as with aggregate time-series data— but also for heterogeneity among those 
agents (firms, establishment or plants) that are the potential receivers of public subsidies.
More aggregated data are less adequate because they hide firm heterogeneity, which is
extremely relevant for distinguishing firms’ R&D strategies. To our knowledge, many current
firm-level datasets lack information that would be critical for understanding the role of public
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subsidies in private R&D. We have, implicitly or explicitly, suggested the information that
would be worthy of investigation as it applies to the issues that have been examined in this
research. Fourth, empirical work has mostly focused on the manufacturing sector. However,
the services sector has an increasing and prominent weight in most developed countries. It is
therefore important to analyse R&D investment in this sector, to understand how public
subsidies affect it, and to compare the results with those for manufacturing. Fifth, most
studies have explored the effect of public subsidies on private R&D investments in the short
term, but dynamic considerations must be acknowledged. Empirical evidence suggests that
the effect of public subsidies on private R&D need not be instantaneous and can be
distributed over a longer span of time, so short-term and long-term effects might differ. Cross-
sectional data cannot be used for this purpose, and firm-level longitudinal data are needed.
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of public subsidies is mixed and therefore
inconclusive. Although results supporting the additionality hypothesis prevail, there are
valuable contributions in favour of the substitution hypothesis and others that demonstrate a
negligible effect. We believe that, in addition to methodological differences, the theoretical
framework of analysis, the population under study (e.g., the country and sample period, the
type of firms) and the sources and characteristics of the subsidy programmes might determine
whether the additionality or the substitution effect is observed.
Although the most recent studies are more similar to one another in their methodological
approaches, we argue that the empirical literature has tended to focus on a subset of the issues
at stake while disregarding others. The existing empirical literature on the effectiveness of
public R&D subsidies has been constrained by a lack of information and analysis on the
following main issues: 1) the firm’s history of past and current subsidies (i.e., the frequency
with which a firm receives subsidies); 2) the time lag structure (i.e., how the potential effect
of subsidies is distributed over time); 3) the firm’s internal liquidity and potential financial
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constraints; 4) the composition of firm R&D; 5) the amount of subsidy granted to the firm;
and 6) the different sources of public subsidies. Our survey shows that most of these issues
have been addressed separately in different studies, primarily since the end of the 1990s. We
believe that considering all of these issues explicitly would improve our understanding of
public subsidies and their impact on firm R&D strategy. Specifically, we aimed at
contributing to scholarly knowledge with the research assumptions propounded in this study.
We posit that, under different situations, public subsidies are expected to exert additionality or
substitution effects on private R&D investment.
We must acknowledge, nonetheless, that there are further interesting issues that we have
not raised in this study that would also be worth exploring.21 These include the wage effects
of subsidies (see Goolsbee, 1998), the interaction of public subsidies with other mechanisms
―such as tax incentives― to boost private R&D (see Guellec and Pottelsberghe, 2003; 
Bérubé and Mohnen, 2009), or the potential impacts of uncertainty and instability on subsidy
policies (see Guellec and Pottelsberghe, 2003).22 This latter issue may also be of special
interest in countries that are facing the negative consequences of the economic crisis that
arose in the late 2000s.
In conclusion, a great number of researchers have made much progress in the study of the
potential effect of public subsidies on private R&D investment. The issues explicitly
considered in our study can inspire further advancement in the near future. Our survey
suggests that although significant progress has already been made in this field of study, many
interesting research issues remain to be tackled.
21
REFERENCES
Aerts, K. and Czarnitzki, D. (2004) Using innovation survey data to evaluate R&D policy: the
case of Belgium. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 04-55, Mannheim.
Aerts, K. and Czarnitzki, D. (2006) The impact of public R&D funding in Flanders. IWT-
Studies No. 54, Brussel.
Aerts, K. and Schmidt, T. (2008) Two for the price of one? Additionality effects of R&D
subsidies: a comparison between Flanders and Germany. Research Policy 37(5): 806-
822.
Aerts, K. and Thorwarth, S. (2008) Additionality effects of public R&D funding: ‘R’ versus
‘D’. FBE Research Report MSI No 0811. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Belgium.
Ali-Yrkkö, J. (2005) Impact of public R&D financing on private R&D. Does financial
constraint matter? Working Paper No. 30. ENEPRI, Brussels.
Almus, M. and Czanitzki, D. (2003) The effects of public R&D subsidies on firm’s
innovation activities. The case of Eastern Germany. Journal of Business & Economic
Statistics 21(2): 226-236.
Antonelli, C. (1989) A failure-inducement model of research and development expenditure.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 12(2): 159-180.
Arrow, K.J. (1962) Economic welfare and the allocation of resources to invention. In Nelson,
R.R. (ed.), The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors
(pp. 609-625). Princeton University Press.
Aschhoff, B. (2009) The effect of subsidies on R&D investment and success. Do subsidy
history and size matter? ZEW Discussion Paper No. 032, Mannheim.
Bentzen, J. and Smith, V. (1999) An empirical analysis of R&D expenditure in the Nordic
countries. Paper presented at the IAES Meeting, Montreal, october.
Berger, A.N. and Udell, G.F. (1990) Collateral, loan quality and bank risk. Journal of
Monetary Economics 25(1): 21-42.
Bérubé, C. and Mohnen, P. (2009) Are firms that receive R&D subsidies more innovative?
Canadian Journal of Economics 42(1): 206-225.
Bester, H. (1985) Screening versus rationing in credit markets with imperfect information.
American Economic Review 75(4): 850-855.
Bhattacharya, S. and Ritter, J. (1983) Innovation and communications: signalling with partial
disclosure. Review of Economic Studies 50(2): 331-46.
Blanes, J.V. and Busom, I. (2004) Who participates in R&D subsidy programs? The case of
Spanish manufacturing firms. Research Policy 33(10): 1459-1476.
Blank, D.M. and Stigler, G.J. (1957) The Demand and Supply of Scientific Personnel. New
York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bloch, C., and Graversen, E.K. (2008). Additionality of public R&D funding in business
R&D. Working Paper No 5. The Danish Center for Studies in Research and Research
Policy, University of Aarhus, Denmark.
Branstetter, L. and Sakakibara, M. (1998) Japanese research consortia: a microeconometric
analysis of industrial policy. Journal of Industrial Economics 46(2): 207-233.
Brouwer, E. and Kleinknecht, A. (1999) Keynes-plus? Effective demand and changes in firm-
level R&D: an empirical note. Cambridge Journal of Economics 23(3): 385-391.
22
Brown, J.R. Fazzari, S.M., and Petersen, B.C. (2008) Financing innovation and growth: cash
flow, external equity and the 1990s R&D boom. Journal of Finance 64(1): 151-185.
Busom, I. (2000) An empirical evaluation of R&D subsidies. Economics of Innovation and
New Technology 9(2): 111-148.
Buxton, A. (1975) The process of technical change in UK manufacturing. Applied Economics
7(1): 53-71.
Callejón, M. and García-Quevedo, J.G. (2002) Las ayudas públicas a la I+D empresarial. Un
análisis sectorial. Document de Treball No. 6. Institut d’Economia de Barcelona.
Barcelona.
Capron, H. and van Pottelsberghe, B. (1997) Public support to business R&D: a survey and
some new quantitative evidence. In OECD, Policy Evaluation in Innovation and
Technology. Towards Best Practices (pp. 171-187). Paris.
Carmichael, J. (1981) The effects of mission-oriented public R&D spending on private
industry. Journal of Finance 36(3): 617-627.
Carpenter, R. and Petersen, B. (2002) Capital market imperfections, high-tech investment and
new equity financing. Economic Journal 112(447): 54-72.
Cerulli, G. (2010) Modelling and measuring the effect of public subsidies on business R&D: a
critical review of the econometric literature. The Economic Record 86(274): 421-449.
Clausen, T.H. (2007) Do subsidies have positive impacts on R&D and innovation activities at
the firm level? Working Paper 2007/0615, Centre for Technology, Innovation and
Culture, University of Oslo, Oslo.
Cockburn, I.M. and Henderson, R.M. (1998) Absorptive capacity, coauthoring behavior and
the organization of research in drug discovery. The Journal of Industrial Economics,
46(2): 157-182.
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. (1989) Innovation and learning: the two faces of R&D.
Implications for the analysis of R&D investment. Economic Journal 99(397): 569-596.
Czarnitzki, D., Ebersberger, B. and Fier, A. (2007) The relationship between R&D
collaboration, subsidies and R&D performance: empirical evidence from Finland and
Germany, Journal of Applied Econometrics 22(7): 1347-1366.
Czarnitzki, D. and Fier, A. (2002) Do innovation subsidies crowd out private investment?
Evidence from the German service sector. Applied Economics Quarterly 48(1): 1-25.
Czarnitzki, D. and Hottenrott, H. (2010) Financing constraints for industrial innovation: what
do we know? Working Paper OR 1004, Katholieke Universiteit LEUVEN, Belgium.
Czarnitzki, D., Hottenrott, H. and Thorwarth, S. (2011) Industrial research versus
development investment: the implications of financial constraints. Cambridge Journal
of Economics, 35(3): 527-544.
Czarnitzki, D. and Hussinger, K. (2004) The link between R&D subsidies, R&D spending and
technological performance. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 056, Mannheim.
Czarnitzki, D., Kraft, K. and Thorwarth, S. (2009) The knowledge production of ‘R’ and ‘D’.
Economic Letters 105(1): 141-143.
Czarnitzki, D. and Licht, G. (2006) Additionality of public R&D grants in a transition
economy. The case of Eastern Germany. Economics of Transition 14(1): 101-131.
Czarnitzki, D. and Toole, A.A. (2007) Business R&D and the interplay of R&D subsidies and
product market uncertainty. Review of Industrial Organization 31(3): 169-181.
23
David, P.A., Hall, B.H. and Toole, A.A. (2000) Is public R&D a complement or substitute for
private R&D? A review of econometric evidence. Research Policy 29(4-5): 497-529
Diamond, A.M. (1999) Does federal funding “crowd in” private funding of science.
Contemporary Economic Policy 17(4): 423-431.
Duguet, E. (2004) Are R&D subsidies a substitute or a complement to privately funded R&D?
Evidence from France using propensity score methods for non-experimental data. Revue
d’Economie Politique 114(2): 263-292.
Ebersberger, B (2005) The Impact of Public R&D Funding. Vuorimiehentie : VTT
Publications.
Egeln, J., Licht, G. and Steil, F. (1997) Firm foundations and the role of financial constraints.
Small Business Economics 9(2): 137-150.
Eurostat (2009) Research and Development Expenditure, by Sectors of Performance
(http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu). European Commission.
Falk, R. (2004) Behavioural additionality effects of R&D subsidies: empirical evidence from
Austria. TIP Working Paper, Vienna.
Gannicott, K. (1984) The determinants of industrial R&D in Australia. The Economic Record
60(3): 231-235
García-Quevedo, J. (2004) Do public subsidies complement business R&D? A meta-analysis
of the econometric evidence. KYKLOS 57(1): 87-102.
Globerman, S. (1973) Market structure and R&D in Canadian manufacturing industries.
Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 13(1): 59-68.
Golberg, L. (1979) The influence of federal R&D funding on the demand for and returns to
industrial R&D. Working Paper CRC-388. The Public Research Institute.
González, X., Jaumandreu, J. and Pazó, C. (2005) Barriers to innovation and subsidy
effectiveness. RAND Journal of Economics 36(4): 930-950.
González, X. and Pazó, C. (2008) Do public subsidies stimulate private R&D spending?
Research Policy 37(3): 371-389.
Goolsbee, A. (1998) Does government R&D policy mainly benefit scientists and engineers?
American Economic Review 88(2): 298-302.
Görg, H. and Strobl, E (2007) The effect of R&D subsidies on private R&D. Economica
74(294): 215-234.
Griliches, Z. (1986) Productivity, R&D, and the basic research at the firm level in the 1970's.
American Economic Review 76(1): 141-54,
Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe, B. (2000) The impact of public expenditure on business
R&D. STI Working Papers 2000/4, OECD, Paris.
Guellec, D. and van Pottelsberghe, B. (2003) The impact of public R&D expenditure on
business R&D. Economics of Innovation and New Technologies 12(3): 225-244.
Hall, B.H. (1992) Investment and research and development at the firm level: does the source
of financing matter? NBER Working Paper No. 4096, Cambridge.
Hall, B. H. (2002) The financing of research and development. Oxford Review of Economic
Policy 18(1): 35-51.
Hall, B.H. and van Reenen, J. (2000) How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A review
of the evidence. Research Policy 29(4-5): 449-470.
Hamberg, D. (1966): Essays on the Economics of Research and Development. New York:
Random House.
24
Hao, K.Y. and Jaffe, A.B. (1993) Effect of liquidity on firm’s R&D spending. Economics of
Innovation and New Technology 2(4): 275-82.
Herrera, L. and Heijs, J. (2006) Difusión y adicionalidad de las ayudas públicas a la
innovación. Revista de Economía Aplicada 14(41): 45-65.
Herrera, L. and Martínez, A. (2009) La I+D pública complementa o sustituye la I+D privada?
Un análisis de la insdustria manufacturera española. Paper presented to the XIX
National Conference of ACEDE.
Higgins, R.S. and Link, A.N. (1981) Federal support of technological growth in industry:
some evidence of crowding out. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 28:
86-88.
Himmelberg, C.P. and Petersen, B.C. (1994) R&D and internal finance: a panel study of small
firms in high-tech industries. Review of Economics and Statistics 76(1): 38-51.
Holden, D.R. and Swales, J.K. (1996) Subsidies, additionality and financial constraints: a
comment on Wren. Journal of Regional Science 36(2): 303-310.
Holemans, B. and Sleuwaegen, L. (1988) Innovation expenditures and the role of government
in Belgium. Research Policy 17(6): 375-379.
Howe, J.D. and McFetridge, D.G. (1976) The determinants of R&D expenditures. Canadian
Journal of Economics 9(1): 57-71.
Hubbard, G. (1998) Capital market imperfections and investment. Journal of Economic
Literature 36(1): 193-225.
Hussinger, K. (2008) R&D and subsidies at the firm level: an application of parametric and
semiparametric two-step selection models. Journal of Applied Econometrics 23(6): 729-
747.
Hyytinen, A. and Toivanen, O. (2005) Do financial constraints hold back innovation and
growth? Evidence on the role of public policy. Research Policy 34(9): 1385-1403.
Irwin, D.A. and Klenow, P.J. (1996) High-tech R&D subsidies: estimating the effects of
Sematech. Journal of International Economics 40(3-4): 323-344.
Janz, N., Lööf, H. and Peters, B. (2003) Firm level innovation and productivity– Is there a
common story across countries? ZEW Discussion Paper No. 03-26, Mannheim.
Jensen, M. and Meckling, W. (1976) Theory of the firm, managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 5(4): 305-60.
Kaiser, U. (2004) Private R&D and public R&D subsidies: microeconometric evidence from
Denmark, CEBR Discussion Paper 2004-19, Denmark.
Klette, T.J. and Møen, J. (1998) R&D Investment Responses to R&D Subsidies: A Theoretical
Analysis and a Microeconomic Study. Preliminary draft presented at the NBER Summer
Institute, july.
Klette, T.J. and Møen, J. (1999) From growth theory to technology policy coordination
problems in theory and practice. Nordic Journal of Political Economy 25(1): 53-74.
Klette, T.J., Møen, J. and Griliches, Z. (2000) Do subsidies to commercial R&D reduce
market failures? Microeconomic evaluation studies. Research Policy 29(4-5): 471-495.
Koga, T. (2005) R&D subsidy and self-financed R&D: the case of Japanese high-technology
start-ups. Small Business Economics 24(1): 53-62.
Lach, S. (2002) Do R&D subsidies stimulate or displace private R&D? Evidence from Israel.
Journal of Industrial Economics 50(4): 369-390.
25
Lerner, J. (1999) The government as venture capitalist: the long-run impact of the SBIR
program. Journal of Business 72(3): 285-318.
Levin, R.C. and Reiss, P.C. (1984) Tests of a Schumpeterian model of R&D and market
structure, in Griliches Z. (ed.) R&D, Patents, and Productivity (pp. 175-208). Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Levy, D.M. (1990) Estimating the impact of government R&D. Economic Letters 32(2): 169-
173.
Levy, D.M. and Terleckyj, N.E. (1983) Effects of government R&D on private R&D
investment and productivity: a macroeconomic analysis. Bell Journal of Economics
14(2): 551-561.
Leyden, D.P. and Link, A.L. (1991) Why are governmental R&D and private R&D
complements? Applied Economics 23(10): 1673-1681.
Leyden, D.P., Link, A.L. and Bozeman (1989) The effects of governmental financing on
firm’s R&D activities: a theorical and empirical investigation. Technovation 9(7): 561-
575.
Lichtenberg, F.R. (1984) The relationship between federal contract R&D and company R&D.
American Economic Review 74(2): 73-78.
Lichtenberg, F.R. (1987) The effect of government funding on private industrial research and
development: a re-assessment. Journal of Industrial Economics 36(1): 97-104.
Lichtenberg, F.R. (1988) The private R&D investment response to federal design and
technical competitions. American Economic Review 78(1): 550-559.
Link, A.N. (1982) An analysis of the composition of R&D spending. Southern Economic
Journal 49(2): 342-349.
Long, W.F. and Ravenscraft, D.J. (1993) LBOs, debt and R&D intensity. Strategic
Management Journal 14(1): 119-135.
Lööf, H. and Heshmati, A. (2005) The impact of public funding on private R&D investment:
new evidence from a firm level innovation study. CESIS Electronic Working Paper
Series, Paper No. 06, Stockholm.
Lucas, R.E. (1967) Adjustment costs and the theory of supply. Journal of Political Economy
75(4): 321–334.
Mamuneas, T.P. and Nadiri, M.I. (1996) Public R&D policies and cost behavior of the US
manufacturing industries. Journal of Public Economics 63(1) 57-81.
Mansfield, E. (1980) Basic research and productivity increase in manufacturing. American
Economic Review 70(5): 863-873.
Mansfield, E. and Switzer, L. (1984) Effects of federal support on company-financed R and
D: the case of energy. Management Science 30(5): 562-571.
Meeusen, W. and Janssens, W. (2001) Substitution versus additionality: econometric
evaluation by means of micro-economic data of the efficacy and efficiency of R&D
subsidies to firms in the Flemish region. CESIT Discussion paper No 2001/01,
University of Antwerp.
Močnik, D. (2001) Asset specificity and a firm’s borrowing ability: an empirical analysis of 
manufacturing firms. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 45(1): 69-81.
National Science Board (2008) Science and Engineering Indicators 2008, vol. 1, Chapter 4.
National Science Foundation.
26
Nelson, R.R. (1959) The simple economics of basic scientific research. Journal of Political
Economy 67: 297-306.
Özçelik, E. and Taymaz, E. (2008) R&D support programs in developing countries: the
Turkish experience. Research Policy 37(2): 258-275.
Petersen, M. and Rajan, R. (1994) The benefits of lending relationships: evidence from small
business data. Journal of Finance 49(1): 3-37.
Petersen, M. and Rajan, R. (1995) The effect of credit market competition on lending
relationships: evidence from small business data. Quarterly Journal of Economics
110(2): 407-443.
Robson, M. (1993) Federal funding and the level of private expenditure on basic research.
Southern Economic Journal 60(1): 63-71.
Rosenberg, J.B. (1976) Research and market share: a reappraisal of the Schumpeter
hypothesis. Journal of Industrial Economics 25(2): 101-112.
Savignac, F. (2008) Impact of financial constraints on innovation: what can be learned from a
direct measure? Economics of Innovation and New Technology 17(6): 553-569.
Scellato, G. (2007) Patents, firm size and financial constraints: an empirical analysis for a
panel of Italian manufacturing firms. Cambridge Journal of Economics 31(1): 55-76.
Scott, J. (1984) Firm versus industry variability in R&D intensity. In Griliches, Z. (Ed.):
R&D, Patents and Productivity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Shrieves, R.E. (1978) Market structure and innovation: a new perspective. Journal of
Industrial Economics 26(4): 329-347.
Sørensen, A., Kongsted, H.C. and Marcusson, M. (2003) R&D, public innovation policy, and
productivity: the case of Danish manufacturing. Economics of Innovation and New
Technology 12(2): 163-178.
Stiglitz, J. (1988) Economics of the Public Sector. W.W. Norton and Company: New York.
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A. (1981) Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information,
American Economic Review 71(3): 393-410.
Streicher, G., Schibany, A. and Gretzmacher, N. (2004) Input additionality effects of R&D
subsidies in Austria, TIP Working Paper 04-03, Vienna.
Suetens, S. (2002) R&D subsidies and production effects of R&D personnel: evidence from
the Flemish region. CESIT Discussion Paper 2002/03, University of Antwerp.
Takalo, T. and Tanayama, T. (2010) Adverse selection and financing of innovation: is there a
need for R&D subsidies? Journal of Technology Transfer 35(1): 16-41.
Terleckyj, N.E. (1985) Measuring economic effects of federal research and development
expenditures, recent history with special emphasis on federal R&D performed in
industry. Paper presented to the Workshop on the Federal Role in Research and
Development. National Academies of Science and Enginieering. Washington, DC.
Toivanen, O. and Niininen, P. (1998) Investment, R&D, subsidies and credit constraints.
Working Paper No W-264, Helsinki School of Economics, Helsinski.
Ughetto, E. (2008) Does financial finance matter for R&D? New evidence from a panel of
Italian firms. Cambridge Journal of Economics 32(6): 907-925.
Von Tunzelmann, N. and Martin, B. (1998) Public vs. private funding of R&D and rates of
growth: 1963-1995. Working Paper, Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU), University
of Sussex.
27
Wallsten, S.J. (2000) The effects of government-industry R&D programs on private R&D: the
case of the small business innovation research program. RAND Journal of Economics
31(1): 82-100.
Wolff, G.B. and Reinthaler, V. (2008) The effectiveness of subsidies revisited: Accounting
for wage and employment effects in business R&D. Research Policy 37(8): 1403-1412.
Wren, C. (1994) The build-up and duration of subsidy-induced employment: evidence from
U.K. Journal of Regional Science 34(3): 387-410.
Wu, Y. (2005) The effects of state R&D tax credits in stimulating private R&D expenditure: a
cross-state empirical analysis. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 24(4): 785-
802.
Zhu, P., Xu W. and Lundin, N. (2006) The impact of government’s fundings and tax
incentives on industrial R&D investments. Empirical evidences from industrial sectors
in Shanghai. China Economic Review 17(1): 51-69.
28
Table 1. Empirical studies analyzing the effect of public R&D subsidies on a firm’s R&D spending
Author(s) Country Period Unit of
analysis
Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variable
Method Source of
Funding(1)
R&D (2) Subsidy
History(3)
Time
lag(4)
Shape
of the
effect(5)
Financ.
Constr. (6)
Main Findings Citations(7)
Hamberg
(1966)
USA 1960 Firm: 405
(8 ind.)
[manuf.]
Private R&D
Employ./Total
Employ.
Gov. Contracts/
Assets
Regress.
(Weigh.
OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Mixed: Additionality and N.S. [0.98; 2.28]
Globerman
(1973)
Canada 1965-69 Industry: 15
[manuf.]
Private R&D
Employ./Total
Employ.
Gov.
R&D/Sales
Regress.
(OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality [0,46; 1.26]
Buxton
(1975)
UK 1965 Industry: 11
[manuf.]
Private
R&D/Gross output
Gov. R&D/
Gross output
Regress.
(OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality [0.11; 0.51]
Howe &
McFetridge
(1976)
Canada 1967-71 Firm: 81; 256
firm-year obs.
[manuf.]
Private R&D
expend.
Gov. R&D
grants
Regress.
(Weigh.
OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Mixed: Additionality and N.S. [0.86; 2.64]
Rosenberg
(1976)
USA 1963-64 Firm: 100
[manuf.]
%Total Employ.
alloc. to Profes.
R&D Person.
Gov. R&D
subsidies
Regress.
(OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality [0.42; 1.58]
Shrieves
(1978)
USA 1965 Firm: 411
[manuf.]
(log) Private R&D
Employ.
% R&D finan.
by the Gov.
Regress.
(OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Substitution [0.85; 3.09]
Golberg
(1979)
USA 1958-75 Industry: 14
[manuf.]
(log) Private
R&D/output
Gov.
R&D/Sales
Regress.
(FE OLS)
F.G. A No S-t /L-t
(1-year lag)
L No Substitution and Additionality
in the case of 1-year lag.
Additionality when the sum of
coefficients is considered
[0.03; 0.67]
Carmichael
(1981)
USA 1976-77 Firm: 46; 92
firm-year obs.
[transp. ind.]
Private R&D
expend.
Gov. R&D
contracts
Regress.
(Weigh.
OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Substitution [0.45; 1.58]
Higgins & Link
(1981)
USA 1977 Firm: 174
[manuf.]
% of Research in
private R&D
Gov. R&D
expend.
Regress.
(OLS)
F.G. S [R] No S-t L No Substitution
[estimated elasticity: -0.13]
[0.16; 1.00]
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Link
(1982)
USA 1977 Firm: 275
[manuf.]
Private R&D/Net
Sales
Gov. R&D
expend./ Net
Sales
Regress.
(OLS)
F.G. A
S [BR;
AR; D]
No S-t L No Additionality for aggregate
R&D; Additionality for
‘Development’; N.S. for
‘Applied Research’;
Substitution for ‘Basic
Research’
[1.00; 3.33]
Levy &
Terleckyj
(1983)
USA 1949-81 Country Private Industry
R&D expend.
Total Gov. R&D
exp.; Gov.
contr. R&D and
all other Gov.
R&D
Regress.
(GLS)
F.G. A No S-t/L-t
(3-year lag)
L No Additionality for Total Gov.
Expend. and Gov. contract
R&D (3-year lag)
[$1 of Gov contract performed in
industry induced about 0.27$ of
private expenditure]
[1.41; 4.55]
Gannicott
(1984)
Australia 1976-77
and
1978-79
Industry: 13
[manuf.]
Private R&D
expend.
Gov. grants Regress.
(2SLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No N.S. [0.14; 0.54]
Levin & Reiss
(1984)
USA 1963,
67 and
72
Industry: 20
[manuf.]
Private
R&D/production
costs
Gov. R&D/
shipments
Regress.
(2SLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality
[On the average, $1 increase in
Gov. R&D spending is associated
with a 7-cent increase in company-
financed R&D expend.]
[2.75; 9.71]
Lichtenberg
(1984)
USA 1) 1963-
79
2) 1967,
72, 77
1) Industry:
12 [manuf.]
2) Firm: 991
[manuf.]
1) Change in firm-
funded R&D
(expend. or empl.)
2) R&D expend./
Sales and Change
in Comp. R&D
expend./Sales
1) Change in
Fed. R&D
expend.
2) Gov.
contract
R&D/Sales and
Change in Gov.
cont.
R&D/Sales
Regress.
(FE OLS)
F.G. A No S-t/L-t
(1 and 2-
year lags)
L No 1) Mixed for R&D expenditure:
N.S. in the S-t, Additionality
for 1-year lag, Substitution for
2-year lag. Substitution for
R&D employ. in the S-t,
Additionality for 2 year-lag
2) Additionality, Substitution
[1.75; 5.82]
Mansfield and
Switzer
(1984)
USA 1979 Firm: 25 (4
ind.)
[manuf.]
Change in comp-
financed energy
R&D expend.
Change in the
firms’ Gov.-
financed
energy R&D
expend.
Aggregate
and Regress.
(Logit)
F.G. A No S-t/L-t
(1 to 3-year
lags)
L No Additionality 1-3 year-lags
[For each $1 increase in federal
support these 4 ind. would have
increased their own support of
energy R&D by 6 cents in each of
the first 2 years after the increase
in federal funds]
[0.64; 1.68]
Scott
(1984)
USA 1974 Firm: 437 and
3,388 Line of
Bus. [manuf.]
Comp-financed
R&D/Sales and
(log) Comp-
financed R&D
Gov.-financed
R&D/Sales;
and (log) Gov.-
financed R&D
Regress.
(FE)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality
[The relation is far less significant
when the intensity variables are
removed from the analysis]
[0.07; 8.64]
Terleckyj
(1985)
USA 1964-84 Country Private Industry
R&D expend.
Gov. contract
R&D
Regress.
(GLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality [0.11; 0.22]
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Lichtenberg
(1987)
USA 1) 1956-
83
2) 1979-
84
1) Country
2) Firm: 187
[manuf.]
1) Company funds
for R&D
2) Company funds
for R&D
1) Fed. funds
for R&D
2) Fed. funds
for R&D
Regress.
1) OLS
2) Pooled
OLS
F.G. A No 1) S-t /L-t
(1-year lag)
2) S-t
L No 1) Additionality in the Restric.
Model [Add. for 1-year lag]
and N.S. in the Unrestr.
2) Additionality in the Restrict.
and N.S. in the Unrestric.
Model
[1.28; 5.52]
Lichtenberg
(1988)
USA 1979-84 Firm: 169
[manuf.]
Company-funded
R&D expend.
Gov. R&D
contr. (compet.,
non-competit.)
Regress.
(Weigh.
OLS, IV)
F.G. A No S-t L No Mixed: Additionality in the
case of Weighted OLS and
Substitution in the case of IV
[2.08; 7.33]
Holemans &
Sleuwaegen
(1988)
Belgium 1980-84 Firm: 236
firm-year obs.
(4 ind.) [man.]
(log) Private R&D
expend.
(log) Gov. R&D
grants
Regress.
(FE OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality
[estimated elasticity: 0.25-0.48]
[0.63; 2.04]
Antonelli
(1989)
Italy 1983 Firm: 86
[manuf.]
Priv. R&D
expend.; (log) priv.
R&D expend.
% Gov. –finan.
R&D; and (log)
Gov. R&D/total
R&D
Regress.
(OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality
[estimated elasticity: 0.31-0.37]
[1.35; 4.30]
Leyden et al.
(1989)
USA 1987 Laboratory:
120, 120 firm
[manuf.]
1) Laboratory’s
R&D budget
Laboratory’s
Gov.-financed
R&D budget
Regress.
(3SLS,
2SLS, OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No 1) N.S. with 3SLS [but
Additionality with OLS]
[0.26; 0.70]
Levy
(1990)
9 OECD
countries
1963-84 Country Private R&D
expend.
Gov. contract
R&D
Regress.
(FGLS and
Box-Cox pr.)
F.G. A No S-t L No Mixed: Additionality (the
United States, Japan,
Germany, Sweden, France)
Substitution (the UK and the
Netherlands) and N.S. (Italy,
Swiztzerland)
[0.41; 2.55]
Leyden & Link
(1991)
USA 1987 Laboratory:
137
[manuf.]
1) Total Private
R&D budget
Gov. R&D
approp., contr.,
grants, value
scient., techn.
equip. and
facilit.
Regress.
(3SLS,
2SLS, OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No 1) Additionality
[a $10 million exogenous increase
in Gover. R&D would result in
$22.9 million increase in private
R&D]
[0.86; 2.57]
Robson
(1993)
USA 1955-88 Country Change in Priv.
expend. on Basic
Research
Change in
Federal Spend.
on Basic Res.
and Fed. funds
for Appl. R&D
Regress.
(OLS)
F.G. S [BR] No S-t L No Additionality for ‘Basic
Research’
[0.47; 2.47]
Mamuneas &
Nadiri
(1996)
USA 1956-88 Industry: 15
[manuf.]
(log) Company-
financed R&D
(log) Total
Publ. R&D;
[(log) Inside
publ. R&D;
(log) Outside
publ. R&D]
Regress.
(OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No Substitution for total publicly
funded R&D; Additionality for
inside publicly funded R&D;
and Substitution for outside
publicly funded R&D
[1.81; 9.25]
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Capron & van
Pottelsberghe
(1997)
7 indust.
countries
1973-90 Industry: 22
[manuf.]
(log) Private R&D (log) Gov. R&D
subsidies
Regress.
(OLS FE IV
2SLS)
F.G. A No S-t /L-t
(1-year lag)
L No Mixed: Additionality (the UK),
Substitution (Canada, France,
Italy) and N.S. (the US,
Japan, Germany)
[0.33; 2.87]
Goolsbee
(1998)
USA 1968-94 Scientists and
engineers:
17,700
observations
(log) Real Income
(log) Wages
(log) Hours
(log)Total R&D
spending/GDP
(log) Federally
funded R&D/
GDP
Regress.
(not
specified)
and Simple
Correlation
F.G A No S-t/Lt L No Gov. spending crowds out
private spending by raising
wages. The simple correlation
between federally funded
R&D to GDP and non-fed.
funded R&D to GDP is -0.4.
[The elasticity of the R&D worker
wage with respect to government
spending is about 0.09 in the L-t]
[3.53; 15.57]
Klette & Møen
(1998)
Norway 1982-95 Business
Units: 192
(697 obs.)
[manuf.]
Total R&D
investments
Total Gov. R&D
subsidies
Regress
(FE, First
Diff. OLS)
1) F.G.
2)Councils
Ind. funds,
Ministr.)
A No S-t /L-t
(2-year lag)
L No 1) In the S-t, there is no
crowding out and additionality;
Additionality for 2-year lag
2) There are no clear cut
differ. between the effects of
sub. award. by each agency
[0.64; 3.93]
Toivanen &
Niininen
(1998)
Finland 1989,
1991,
1993
Firm: 133
[manuf.]
Private R&D
expenditure
Gov.-financed
R&D (loans
and subsidies)
Regress.
(First Diff. IV)
F.G. A No S- t /L-t
(1-year lag)
L No Substitution in the case of
subsidies to large firms; N.S.
in the case of small firms
[0.21; 4.00]
Von
Tunzelman &
Martin
(1998)
22 OECD
countries
1969-95 Country Change in Private
R&D
Change in
Public R&D
Regress.
(FE)
F.G A No S-t L No Mixed: Additionality in 5
countries; Substitution in 2
countries and N.S. in the
remaining countries
[0.00; 1.64]
Bentzen &
Smith
(1999)
5 Nordic
countries
1975-95 Country: 105
obs.
Bus. Enterp. Exp.
on R&D; (log)
BERD
Public R&D
Exp. (PERD)
and (log) PERD
ML-Proc.
EG/OLS,
Cointegrat.
F.G. A No S-t /L-t L No Mixed: Additionality in S-t and
L-t in Denmark, Finland,
Iceland; N.S. in S-t and L-t in
Norway, Sweden
[0.00; 0.00]
Brouwer &
Kleinknecht
(1999)
The
Netherl.
1988,
1992
Firm: 441
[manuf. serv.]
Change of the (log
of ) absol. numb.
of R&D person
years
Firm’s partic. in
EC R&D prog.
in 1991-1992
(dummy var.)
Regress.
(OLS)
European
Union
A No S-t L No Additionality
[the model gives only a rough
indication that participation in EC
R&D programmes is favourable to
R&D efforts; nothing can be said
about the effects of subsidies
since information about the
amount of subsidies is lacking]
[0.92; 6.08]
Diamond
(1999)
USA 1953-95 Country (log) Level of
Private Basic
Research
spending
(log) Level of
Federal Basic
Research
spending
Regress.
(First Diff.
OLS)
F.G. S [BR] No S-t L No Additionality
[A $1 million increase in Fed.
‘Basic Research’ spending results
in about a $700,000 increase in
total private ‘Basic Research’
spending]
[0.62; 4.31]
32
Busom
(2000)
Spain 1988 Firm: 147
[manuf.]
Total R&D
Expend. per
Empl., R&D
Personn./Empl.
Partic. in subs.
loan prog.
CDTI, Particip.
in Eur. level
R&D progr.
(dum. var.)
Regress.
(Prob. OLS)
Selection
(ML proc.)
N.G.
(Spain:
CDTI)
EU
A No S-t L No Mixed: Additionality and
Substitution
[Public funding induces an
additional 20% private expenditure
but for about 30% of participants
complete crowding out cannot be
ruled out]
[4.42; 4.92]
Wallsten
(2000)
USA 1990-92 Firm: 81 obs.
[manuf. serv.]
Private R&D
spending in 1992
Number of
SBIR awards
and Total $
value of SBIR
awards
Regress.
(3SLS, IV)
F.G.
(SBIR
program)
A No S-t L No Substitution. The SBIR grants
crowd out private R&D
spending dollar for dollar
[8.08; 37.17]
Meeusen &
Janssens
(2001)
Belgium
(Fland.)
1992-97 Firm: 345;
685 firm-year
obs.
Total am. ‘intra
muros’ R&D
expend./Turn.
Subsidy
granted by
IWT/Turnover
Regress.
(AR1 NLS)
R.G.
(IWT)
EU
A No S-t/L-t
(1-year lag)
L No Additionality for all firms
[estimated elasticity; 0.32-0.66]
and for sub-samples of small-
and medium-sized firms
[0.00; 1.27]
Callejón &
García-Quev.
(2002)
Spain 1989-98 Industry: 24,
168-240 obs.
[manuf.]
(log) Private R&D
expend.
(log) Public
R&D spending
Regress.
(First Diff.,
GMM)
N.G. A No S-t/L-t
(1-2-year
lags)
L No Additionality in the S-t and for
1-year lag
[0.10; 0.60]
Czarnitzki &
Fier
(2002)
German. 1996,
1998
Firm: 1,084
obs.
[serv.]
Innovation
expend./Sales
Probab. of
receiv. public
grants for
innov. (dum.
var.)
Matching
(PS –Probit,
NNM)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality
[An innovation intensity of 5.7%-
points is due to the participation in
different public innovation
programmes]
[1.30; 11.40]
Lach
(2002)
Israel 1990-95 Firm: 136
firms, 325
firm-year obs.
[manuf.]
Level of company-
financed R&D
expend.
Level of R&D
subsidy
(grants)
Regress.
(Pooled DID)
F.G.
(OCS
Minist. of
Industry and
Trade)
A No S-t/L-t
(1-2-year
lags)
L No Mixed: Additionality in small
firms
[1 NIS increases their R&D by
about 11 NIS]
(Subst. in the S-t and Addit. 1
year after receiving the
subsidy), N.S. in large firms
[5.10; 29.10]
Suetens
(2002)
Belgium
(Fland.)
1992-99 Firm: 262,
1,032 firm-
year obs. (13
ind.
[manuf.]
(log) Total R&D
personnel
(log) Gov.
Support for
R&D (Amount
of R&D workers
spons. by IWT)
Regress.
(FE OLS,
2SLS, IV,
SUR, 3SLS)
R.G.
(IWT in
Flanders)
A No S-t/L-t
(1-year lag)
L No Substitution in the S-t and L-t.
[When ignoring fixed firm effects,
about 60% of the public. finan.
R&D would serve as a substitute
for priv. R&D. Taking into account
firm effects, almost comp.substit.
prevails]
[0.20; 1.50]
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Almus &
Czarnitzki
(2003)
German.
(Eastern
Germ.)
1995,
97, 99
Firm: 925
firm-year obs.
(12 ind.)
[manuf.]
(Private R&D
expend./Sales)
*100
Participation in
Public R&D
schemes
(dummy var.)
Matching
(PS –Prob.
NNM)
Diff. Sour.
F.G. R.G.
EU
A No S-t L No Additionality
[The causal effect of subsidies is
about 4 percentage points on
average]
[5.44; 28.11]
Guellec & van
Pottelsberghe
(2003)
17 OECD
countries
1981-96 Country Business-funded
and -performed
R&D
Gov. fund. R&D
implemented in
Business
(procurement
and grants)
Regress.
(3SLS)
F.G. A No S-t/L-t
(1 to 4-year
lags)
C No Additionality in the S-t and L-t
(1-2 and 4 year lags) but
Substitution for 3-year lag.
Inverted-U shape, increasing
up to an average subsid. rate
of about 10%, and decreasing
beyond. Over a level of 20%,
addit. publ. money substit. for
priv. fund.
[4.78; 37.00]
Hyytinen &
Toivanen
(2005)
Finland 2002 Firm: 724
SMEs
[manuf. serv.]
Private R&D
expend.
Interaction
term: Fraction
of Total Debt
and Equity
attrib. to diff.
Gov. Agenc.*
Dep. exter. fin.
Regress.
(Tobit ML,
OLS, CLAD)
Different
sources
(All the
agencies
prov. public
SME
support)
A No S-t L Yes
(Dep. of
external
finance)
[Moderat
or
Variable]
Additionality. Gover. funding
disproport. helps firms in
industries that are dependent
on external finance. The
innovat. of small firms is
constrained by access to
extern. finance. Gov. funding
is able to alleviate such
constraints
[2.86; 16.14]
Janz et al.
(2003)
German
Sweden
1998-
2000
Firm: 575
(Germ.) and
474 (Swed.)
firm-year obs.
[manuf.]
(log) Private
innovation expend.
per employee
Receipt of
public finan.
support for
innov. Activ.
(dummy var.)
Regress.
(Tobit ML)
F.G. A No S-t L No N.S. (both countries) [0.33; 13.89]
Sørensen et
al.
(2003)
Denmark 1974-95 Industry: 6
[manuf.]
Real private R&D
expend.
Real Public
Costs of Innov.
Support (subs.)
Regress.
(MG, PMG)
N.G.
(Danish
Agency for
Trade and
Industry)
A No L-t
(long-run
equilib. relat.)
L No Additionality
[estimated elasticity: 0.062]
[0.22; 1.33]
Aerts &
Czarnitzki
(2004)
Belgium
(Fland.)
1998-
2000
Firm: 776
observ.
[manuf. serv.]
(log) Priv. R&D
expend.
(log) Priv. R&D
exp,./Turn.*100
Prob. of receiv.
R&D subsidies
(dummy var.)
Matching
(PS –Prob.
Kernel)
F.G.
R.G.
EU
A No S-t L No Additionality
[treatment effects: 2.2-2.8% for
R&D intensity. Full and partial
crowding-out effects are rejected]
[0.75; 7.38]
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Czarnitzki &
Hussinger
(2004)
German. 1992-
2000
Firm: 3,779
firm-year obs.
[manuf.]
1) Total Private
R&D exp. (Tot.
R&D/Sal.*100)
2) Net am. of R&D
subs. (Net am. of
R&D/ Sales*100)
Prob. of receiv.
subsidies
(dummy var.)
Matching
(PS, Probit,
NN)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality
[treatment effects: 1) 1.15 (1.89);
2) 0.90 (0.97)]
[4.00; 8.00]
Duguet
(2004)
France 1985-97 Firm: 1,032-
1,672
[manuf. serv.]
Maint. or incr. the
priv. R&D to sales
(dum. var.);
Growth rate R&D
to sal.
Probab. of
receiv. a
subsidy
(grants)
(dummy var.)
Matching
(PS –Logit,
Kernel)
F.G.
(Ministries:
Defense,
Industry and
Research)
A Yes S-t
(yearly
estimat.)
L No Additionality
[On average, public funds add to
private funds, so that there would
be no significant crowding-out
effect. Substitution effect in 1987]
[1.88; 16.88]
Falk
(2004)
Austria 1995-
2002
Firm: 1,064
[manuf. serv.]
(log) The average
annual growth rate
of R&D-personnel
(log) R&D-
subs. ratio (i.e.
FFF-subsid.
share in total
R&D-exp.)
Regress.
(FE, Partial
Adjust.)
F.G.
(Austrian
Fed. R&D-
sup. schem-
FFF)
A No S-t/L-t
(1-year lag)
L No Additionality in the S-t and L-t
(1-year lag)
[estimated elasticity: 0.02 in the S-
t and 0.06 in the L-t]
[0.00; 1.75]
Kaiser
(2004)
Denmark 2001 Firms: 1,101
[manuf. serv.]
Private R&D
expend./Sales
Prob. of receiv.
public R&D
sup.
(dummy var.)
Regr. (Prob.
OLS IV)
Matching
(PS –Prob.
NNM Kern.
Stratif.)
F.G.
(Ministry of
Econ. and
Business
Affairs)
A No S-t L No N.S. [1.13; 4.88]
Streicher et al.
(2004)
Austria 1997-
2002
Firm: 495;
2,194 firm-
year observ.
Total Private R&D
expend.
Public
subsidies (FFF
funding)
Regress.
(FE GLS)
F.G.
(Austrian
Industrial
Res. Prom.
Fund -FFF)
A No S-t L No Additionality
[the funding coefficient is about
1.26-1.54]
[0.38; 2.25]
Ali-Yrkkö
(2005)
Finland 1996-02 Firm: 441;
1,640 firm-
year obs.
(Techn. Ind.)
Private funded
R&D
Public R&D
subsid. granted
(amount of
public funding)
Regress.
(OLS IV)
F.G.
(Finnish
Tech.
Agency
TEKES)
A No S-t/L-t
(1-year lag)
L Yes
(L-t debt)
[Mod.
Var.]
Additionality in the S-t and L-t.
Public R&D funding increases
firms’ total R&D expend. even
in non-financially constrained
firms
[0.00; 4.57]
Ebersberger
(2005)
Finland 1994-96
1998-
2000
Firm: 2,462
firm-year
observ.
[manuf. serv.]
1) Total priv.
innov. exp./Sal.
2) Total priv.
innov. expend.
Prob. of receiv.
public funding
(dummy var.)
1) Matching
(PS –Prob.
Kernel NNM)
2) Selection
F.G.
(National
Technology
Agency-
TEKES)
A No S-t L No Additionality. Total (complete)
or partial crowding-out effects
are excluded
[The impact varies between 6%
and 25% of the total innovation
expend.]
[0.43; 2.29]
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González et
al.
(2005)
Spain 1990-99 Firm: 2,214
[manuf.]
(log) Total R&D
expend./Sales
Total amount of
public
subsidies
(grants)/Total
R&D expend.
Regress.
(Tobit ML)
N.G.
(CDTI)
R.G.
EU
A No S-t L No Additionality
[The actual subsidies play a part,
even if a modest one. This impact
grows with the size of the
subs.,but the increase in priv.
effort for subs. running from 20%
to 60% is by about 2% to 7%]
[4.14; 20.00]
Koga
(2005)
Japan 1995-98 Firm: 223,
642 firm-year
obs. (6 ind.)
[manuf.]
(log) Corporate
R&D expend.
Prob. of receiv.
R&D subsidies
(SRDCT)
(dummy var.)
Regress.
(FE OLS IV)
F.G. A No S-t/L-t
(1-year lag)
L No Additionality in the S-t and L-t
(1-year lag), particularly in
mature firms
[0.57; 2.86]
Löof &
Heshmati
(2005)
Sweden 1998-
2000
Firm: 770
[manuf. serv.]
R&D expend. per
employee
Prob. of receiv.
public R&D
subs. (grants)
(dummy var.)
Matching
(PS –Prob.
NNM Kernel)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality among small
sized firms. N.S. for medium
and large sized firms
[0.14; 4.00]
Wu
(2005)
USA 1979-95 State: 13 Total per capita
Comp. expend. for
ind. R&D (in a
state)
Per capita
Federal R&D
subsid. to
indust. by state
Regress.
(FE OLS)
F.G. A No S-t L No N.S. [0.71; 3.71]
Aerts &
Czarnitzki
(2006)
Belgium
(Fland.)
1998-
2000
Firm: 776
observ.
[manuf. serv.]
(log) Private R&D
expend.
Private R&D
expend./Turn.
*100
1) Prob. receiv.
R&D subsidies
(dummy var.)
2) Amount of
publ. R&D
fund.
Matching
(PS –Prob.
NNM)
Regress. (IV)
R.G.
(IWT in
Flanders)
A No S-t L No 1) Additionality
[Subsidized firms spend between
50% and 100% more on R&D]
2) Additionality. Full and
partial crowding-out effects
are rejected
[treatment effect: 0.85-1.34%]
[0.67; 2.83]
Czarnitzki &
Licht
(2006)
German. 1994,
96, 98,
2000
Firm: 6,462
obs.
[manuf.]
(log) Tot. priv.
R&D exp.; (log)
Inn. expend.
Tot. R&D exp./
Sal*100; Inn.
Exp./ Sal*100
Prob. of receiv.
public R&D
subsidies
(dummy var.)
Matching
(PS –Prob.
NNM)
F.G.
R.G.
EU
A No S-t L No Additionality: Both R&D
intens. and innov. intens. are
considered higher if firms
receive public R&D grants.
[The treatment effects are more
pronounced in the East than in the
West]
[3.83; 16.67]
Herrera &
Heijs
(2006)
Spain 1998-
2000
Firm: 681
[manuf.]
Private R&D
exp../Sales*100
Prob. of receiv.
public R&D
sub.
(grants)
Matching
(PS –Log.
NNM)
N.G.
R.G.
EU
A No S-t L No Additionality
[treatment effect: 1.85%]
[0.17; 5.17]
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Zhu et al.
(2006)
China
(Shang)
1993-
2002
Industry: 32
[manuf.]
Private industr.
R&D expend.
Gov. direct
fundings
(grants)
Regress.
(First diff.
GMM)
F.G. A [AR
and D]
No S-t/L-t
(1-year lag)
C No Additionality in the S-t and L-t:
inverted U-shaped
relationship between Gov.
funding and R&D investment
[0.83; 2.00]
Clausen
(2007)
Norway 1999-
2001
Firm: 1,074 (log) Am. priv.
intern R&D exp.
(log) Res. exp.
Dev. exp.
(log) ‘Far from’,
‘Close to’ the
market
subsidies
Regress.
(2SLS IV)
Diff.
Sourc.
(SND, NRC,
Ministries,
FUNN, EU)
A
S [AR;
D]
No S-t L No Additionality: ‘Far from the
market’ and Priv. R&D exp.
and ‘Research expend.’
[estimated elasticities: 0.36 and
1.34]
Substitution: ‘Close to the
market’ and Priv. R&D exp.
and ‘Develop. expend.’
[estimated elasticities: -0.66 and -
0.67]
[0.40; 4.20]
Czarnitzki et
al.
(2007)
German.
Finland
1996,
2000
Firm: 1,043
(Ger.) 1,459
(Fin.)
[manuf. serv.]
Priv. R&D
expend./Sales*100
Public funding
(dummy var.)
Matching
(PS –Prob.
NNM)
F.G.
Projektträg
(Ger.)
Tekes
(Fin.)
A No S-t L No N.S. in German firms
Additionality in Finnish firms
[3.00; 14.60]
Czarnitzki &
Toole
(2007)
German. 1998-
2000
P.C.S.
Firm: 702,
925 obs.
[manuf.]
(log) Priv. R&D
expend.
(log) Priv. R&D
expend./Sales
Public R&D
subsidy awards
Regress.
(Tob.)
Diff.
Sourc.
(F.G. R.G.
EU)
A No S-t L No Additionality
[the marginal increase in R&D
from receiving a subsidy is 39%]
[0.60; 4.80]
Görg & Strobl
(2007)
Rep. of
Ireland
1998-
2002
Plant: 828-
4,192 obs.
Dom. Foreign
[manuf.]
(log) Priv. R&D
expend.
(log) Priv. exp. per
employ.
(log) value of
Public R&D
subs. (grants):
Small-Med-Lar.
Matching
(PS –Prob.)
Regr. (DID)
F.G.
(IDA
Ireland,
Forbairt)
A No S-t C No Mixed: Additionality for
domestic and small grants,
Substitution for domestic and
too large grants, N.S. for
foreign. Inverted U-shaped
relat. for domestic
[2.80; 13.00]
Aerts &
Schmidt
(2008)
German.
Belgium
(Fland.)
1998-
2000,
2002-04
Firm: 3,902
(Ger) 1,471
(Flem); 4,565
obs. (Ger.)
1,665 (Flem)
[manuf. serv.]
(log) R&D exp.
(log) R&D exp./
Sales*100
Prob. of receiv.
public R&D
subs. (grants)
Matching
(PS –Prob.
NNM)
Regress.
(CDiDRCS)
F.G.
R.G.
EU
A No S-t L No Additionality
[R&D intensity of Ger. (Flem.)
funded firms is 76% to 100% (64%
to 91%) higher than R&D intensity
of non-funded firms]
[1.50; 14.50]
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Aerts &
Thorwarth
(2008)
Belgium
(Fland.)
2002-04
2004-06
Firm: 521
obs.
Private R&D exp.
Research. exp.
Developm. exp.
Prob. of receiv.
public R&D
subs. (grants);
Amount public
subsid. receiv.
Selection
(Prob.)
Regress.
(IV)
F.G.
R.G.
EU
(IWT)
A
S [R; D]
No S-t L No Additionality for R&D effort
[A subsidy of 1 Mill. EUR
increases the average R&D
expenditure with 1.644 million
EUR]
Additionality for Develop.
expend. and Substitution for
Research expend.
[0.00; 0.25]
Bloch &
Graversen
(2008)
Denmark 1998-
2005
Firm: 1,369
obs.
[manuf. serv.]
Private R&D exp. Prob. of receiv.
public R&D
Amount public
subsd. receiv.
Selection
(Heckman)
Regress.
(OLS, Boot,
IV)
F.G.
(Diff.
Sources)
E.U.
A Yes S-t L No Additionality
[A 1% increase in public funding
yields 0.08-0.11% increase in
private R&D]
[0.00; 0.50]
González &
Pazó
(2008)
Spain 1990-99 Firm: 2,214,
9,455 obs.
[manuf.]
(Lagged) Priv.
R&D exp./Sales
Total R&D
exp./Sales
Prob. of receiv.
public financing
(dummy var.)
Matching
(PS –Prob.
Bias-cor.
NNM)
Diff.
Sources.
(N.G.
R.G.
EU)
A No S-t L No Additionality
[0.72 for total effort. Slighly higher
effect in small and medium-sized
and in high-tech firms] [0.35 for
Private effort. Signif. effect in small
and low-tech firms]
[5.50; 22.00]
Hussinger
(2008)
German. 1992-
2000
Firm: 3,744
observ.
[manuf.]
Private R&D
expend. per
employee
Prob. of receiv.
public R&D
funding
(dum. var.)
(log) Am. of
past publ. R&D
fund.
Selection
(Probit PS
Heckman
Cosslett
Newey
Robinson)
F.G.
(BMBF)
A Yes S-t C No Additionality. U-shaped
relationship. The effect of past
subsidies is negative up to
some threshold level, above
which it has a positive effect
[1.50; 22.75]
Özçelik &
Taymaz
(2008)
Turkey 1993-
2001
Establish:
20,036,
98,366 obs.
[manuf.]
Total R&D
expend./Output
Private R&D
expend./Output
R&D Loan-
recipient, R&D
Grant recipient
(dum. var.)
R&D
subs./Outp.
Regress.
(Tob. FE RE
IV GMM
DID)
Matching
(PS –Log.
NNM DID)
F.G.
(TTGV
TIDEB)
A No S-t L No Additionality in Regress. and
Matching
[Matching Method: All
observations –supported firms
increase their R&D intensity by
2.56% points and own R&D
intensity by 1.95%. Only R&D
performers –support-recipients
increase their R&D intensity by
1.14% points and own R&D
intensity by 0.78 points]
[1.75; 5.00]
Wolff &
Reinthaler
(2008)
15 OECD
countries
1981-
2002
Country: 216-
255 obs.
(log) Number of
researchers
(log) Total R&D
expend.
(log) Subsidy
rate=Gov.
Subs./Own
finan.
(grants,
procur.)
Regress.
(IV LSDV
LSDVC)
F.G. A No S-t/L-t
(1-year lag)
L No Additionality in the S-t and L-t
[The elasticity is roughly 20%
larger for expenditure than for
employment. The short-term
impact is much weaker than the
long-run effect of subsidies]
[0.00; 5.50]
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Aschhoff
(2009)
German. 1994-
2005
Firm: 3,583,
8,528 firm-
year obs.
[manuf. serv.]
(log) Total R&D
exp. (/Sal.*100)
(log) Priv. R&D
exp. (/Sal.*100)
Prob. of receiv.
public R&D
subsid. (grants)
Matching
(PS –Prob.
Multinom.
Prob. NNM)
F.G.
(DPF
Scheme)
A Yes S-t L No Additionality
[Frequently given grants as well as
medium and large-sized grants are
suitable to increase private R&D
expend.]
[0.33; 3.00]
Bérubé &
Mohnen
(2009)
Canada 2005 Establish:
2,785 obs.
[manuf.]
1) Nature of
innovations
2) Number of new
or significant.
Improved products
3) Economic
success of the
newly introduced
products
Prob. of receiv.
public funding
(grants)
(dummy var.)
Matching
(PS –Prob.
NNM)
F.G. A No S-t L No Additionality
[Firms that receive grants and tax
credits instead of only tax credit
are more innovative]
[0.00; 10.67]
Herrera &
Martínez
(2009)
Spain 1995-99 Industry: 12
[manuf.]
Priv. R&D exp.
Priv. R&D
expend./Sales
Public R&D
funding
Regress.
(not
specified)
Diff.
Sourc.
(not specif.)
A No S-t L No Additionality for priv. R&D
expend.
[1 add. € of funding induces firms
to contribute an add. 44 cents of
their own money]
N.S. for R&D intensity
[0.00; 0.00]
Czarnitzki et
al.
(2011)
Belgium
(Fland.)
1999-
2007
Firm: 952
firms, 3,686
year obs.
[manuf. serv.]
Priv. R&D exp. per
tang. ass.
Research exp.
Developm. exp.
Gov. Funding
(dum. var.)
Regress.
(Tobit; RE,
Wooldridge)
F.G. S [R;
D]
No S-t/L-t
(1-year lag)
L Yes
(Working
Cap.)
[Mod.
Var.]
Additionality for ‘Research’
and N.S. for ‘Development’.
Public subsidies directed at
‘Research’ indeed alleviate
financial constraints
[0.00; 12.67]
(1) This column shows information on the major public agencies providing support for private R&D: F.G. (Federal Government), N.G. (National Government), R.G.
(Regional Government). (2) This column shows how the effect of private R&D spending is explored, i.e., aggregately (A) or separately (S). In this latter case, we also
distinguish between Research (R), Basic Research (BR) or Applied Research (AR) and Development (D). (3) This column indicates whether the study provides information
on a firm’s subsidy history. (4) This column shows whether the study considers short-term (S-t) and/or long-term (L-t) effects. (5) This column shows whether the shape of
the subsidy effect is assumed to be Linear (L) or Curvilinear (C). (6) This column shows whether the study explores the effect of financial constraints (Yes or No), as well
as the specific moderator variable involved in the empirical analysis. (7) This column displays the number of citations of each study weighted by the number of years since
publication. The first figure in the bracket uses the ISI Web of Knowledge, while the second one uses Google Scholar.
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Table 2. Summary distribution of econometric studies of the effect of R&D subsidies on
private R&D spending according to the aggregation level and data source
Aggregation level ‘crowding-in
hypothesis’
‘crowding-out
hypothesis’
Non-
significant
effects
Total
number
of studies
Firm or lower(*) 48
(63.15%)
15
(19.74%)
13
(17.11%)
76(**)
(64.41%)
Based only on US data
Based only on EU
Based on R. of the W. data
10
33
5
8
6
1
4
7
2
22
46
8
Industry 10
(50%)
5
(25%)
5
(25%)
20
(16.95%)
Based only on US data
Based only on EU data
Based on R. of the W. data
4
4
2
3
1
1
2
1
2
9
6
5
Country 13
(59.09%)
3
(13.63%)
6
(27.28%)
22
(18.64%)
Based only on US data
Based only on EU data
Based on R. of the W. data
6
2
5
0
1
2
2
2
2
8
5
9
Total number of studies 71
(60.17%)
23
(19.49%)
24
(20.34%) 118
(**)
(*) Lower refers to studies performed at business unit- and plant-level or below.
(**) The total number of studies finding crowding-in, crowding-out or non-significant effects is 118. This number
is greater than the number of reviewed studies (77) because there are several studies that find divergent results
depending on the different assumptions and/or methods considered. Moreover, in most studies performed at
country-level it is possible to confirm the crowding-in hypothesis in the case of some countries, but also the
crowding-out hypothesis in the case of other countries, or even non-significant effects in some countries.
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1 There are several public policy instruments to boost R&D. The most important ones are direct subsidies (i.e.,
grants, loans or procurements), fiscal incentives (i.e., tax credits), public research performed in public
institutions, and R&D consortia (David et al., 2000; Hall and van Reenen, 2000; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe,
2003). Nevertheless, our main concern in this study is public R&D subsidies.
2 Qualitative and quantitative research studies are used in analysing the relationship between public and private
R&D investment. We will focus our review on quantitative studies to facilitate the comparability of findings
across different studies.
3 This finding is in line with David et al. (2000), who reviewed 33 empirical studies, finding 11 studies reporting
‘net’ substitution.
4 A detailed discussion of this critical issue can be found in David et al. (2000, pp.509-510), Klette et al. (2000,
pp.479-481) or, most recently, Cerulli (2010).
5 For a review of these econometric approaches, see, for example, Özçelik and Taymaz (2008) or Cerulli (2010).
6 This approach combines the advantages of matching and difference-in-differences estimators and eliminates
some of their respective disadvantages.
7 In some way, this idea is reflected in several governmental programmes, such as the SEMATECH and SBIR
programmes performed in the US (see, for example, Irwin and Klenow, 1996; Lerner, 1999; and Wallsten,
2000), the Japanese research consortia (see, for example, Branstetter and Sakakibara, 1998), or the IT
programme supported in Norwegian high-tech firms (see, for example, Klette and Møen, 1999).
8 More specifically, this author finds a stimulating (i.e., additional) and significant effect of subsidies on private
R&D only for the firms that are frequent recipients of subsidies from the so-called Direct R&D Project Funding -
a scheme used by the German Federal Government to fund R&D in firms.
9 Specifically, they find “an effect of 19 cents induced in private industry R&D expenditures per dollar of federal
outlay for R&D carried out outside industry after a three year lag” (1986, p.554).
10 Drawing on a sample of 25 firms belonging to four leading American industries, the authors find that “For
each dollar increase in federal support, these four industries, taken as a whole, would have increased their own
support of energy R&D by 6 cents in each of the first two years after the increase in federal funds” (1984,
p.564).
11 The limited internal liquidity of firms may also be affected by the firms’ debt payment obligations. The higher
the firms’ obligations in relation to the availability of internal funds, the less liquidity remains for activities that
must be internally funded, like R&D. Consequently, high leverage (debt) levels may put pressure on the firm to
use its internal funds to pay the debt interests at the expense of investing in R&D (Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Hall,
1992; Long and Ravenscraft, 1993).
12 However, Holden and Swales (1996), considering a more flexible formulation of financial constraints than
Wren (1994), suggest that financial constraints may restrict leverage and thereby limit the effectiveness of public
subsidies.
13 Yet, it is also interesting to recognise that this author concludes that the additionality effect of public funding
is even larger in large firms (that are classified as non-financially constrained) than in small firms.
14 Savignac (2008) corroborates that the likelihood of financial constraints decreases with firm size and depends
to a large extent on the firms’ ex-ante capital structure. Egeln et al. (1997) and Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995)
provide empirical evidence for financial constraints in start-up firms.
15 Whereas Research is primarily related to technical or scientific advancement, Development has to do with the
translation of such advancements into particular products and/or process innovations. Therefore, Research
activities will usually precede Development activities. Some national organisations foster an even finer
breakdown: Basic Research, Applied Research and Development. Basic Research represents original
investigation for the advancement of scientific knowledge that “does not have a specific immediate commercial
objective although it may be performed in fields of present or potential commercial interest”. Applied Research
represents investigation to discover new scientific knowledge that “has a specific commercial objective with
respect to products, processes or services”. Development is the technical use of the scientific knowledge gained
from Research “directed to the production of useful materials, devices, systems, or methods, including the design
and development of prototypes and processes” (see, for example, National Science Board, 2008, Chapter 4, p.9).
On the other hand, the existing literature also uses the concepts ‘projects far from the market’ for referring to
Research projects and ‘projects close to the market’ for referring to Development projects (e.g., Clausen, 2007).
Thus, such concepts may be used interchangeably.
16 He warns that these findings should be interpreted cautiously because his study is based on survey responses
for only one year and, thus, is likely to be biased by the subjective views of the respondents. Furthermore,
neither Higgins and Link (1981) nor Link (1982) control for potential endogeneity problems between public and
private R&D spending.
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17 There may be, nonetheless, some outstanding differences between the R&D programmes at the EU level and
R&D programmes at the national and regional levels. Whereas EU programmes usually require firms to
cooperate with other firms and/or institutions from several EU countries, national and regional programmes do
not, although it might be encouraged.
18 See, in Table 1, the studies by Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Aerts and Czarnitzki, 2004; Aerts and Schmidt,
2008; Aerts and Thorwarth, 2008; Busom, 2000; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; Czarnitzki and Toole, 2007;
González et al., 2005; González and Pazó, 2008; Herrera and Heijs, 2006; Herrera and Martínez, 2009; Hyytinen
and Toivanen, 2005; Klette and Møen, 1998; or Meeusen and Janssens, 2001.
19 This latter study is, in fact, more focused on the participation stage than on the effects that can be obtained
from different programmes.
20 Clausen (2007) merges policy support from the NRC, EU and SkatteFUNN’s programmes into one type of
subsidy called ‘far from the market’. On the other hand, he merges the SND and Ministries’ R&D programmes
into another type of subsidy called ‘close to the market’.
21 We are grateful to one of the referees for this list of issues.
22 Goolsbee (1998) argues that the conventional literature ignores the fact that most private R&D spending
corresponds to salary payments for R&D personnel. Consequently, he finds that firms use an important fraction
of public subsidies of private R&D to increase wages of existing R&D personnel rather than increasing R&D
activity. This finding leads him to suggest that the conventional literature may be overstating the effects of
government R&D spending by as much as 30-50 percent. He also finds that government R&D spending may
directly crowd out private inventive activities because the correlation between the ratio of federally funded R&D
to GDP and the ratio of non-federally funded R&D to GDP is -0.4. On the other hand, Guellec and Pottelsberghe
(2003) find that direct government funding (via subsidies, for instance) and R&D tax incentives are substitutes.
This means that increased intensity of one reduces the effect of the other on private R&D investment. However,
Bérubé and Mohnen (2009) find an opposite result by which Canadian firms that received both R&D grants and
R&D tax credits are significantly more innovative than those that received only R&D tax incentives. Finally,
Guellec and Pottelsberghe (2003) also find that direct funding (and tax incentives) is more effective when it is
stable over time. This implies that firms will not invest in additional R&D if they are not certain that the policy
will be kept in the future.
